Following the end of the Cold War, the UK like so many of our allies, not only accepted what we now refer to as the “peace dividend” but also continued a journey to modernise our defence procurement system. Part of the reform agenda was to move away from the dominance of single-source or non-competed contracts which made up over 70% of all MOD procurement (by volume) in 2009/10 through an increasing focus on the use of competition as the principal method of determining value-for-money. By 2021/22, competition was the basis of awarding over 50% of all MOD contracts placed, a significant increase. With that policy of driving towards competition came a willingness to open up the UK defence market to international competitors without constraint, a policy that has never really been adopted by any of our allies or competitors. Whilst this, in theory, brought the benefits of gaining access to the best available warfighting capability and allowed the UK to benefit from larger non-UK programmes, it came at a price that was unexpected at the time. Over time, a number of critical UK defence capabilities have been delivered by multinational companies who are headquartered outside the UK.  That brings us back to the present, and the changing face of modern warfare, well evidenced in the war in Ukraine. Not only has that conflict changed the way we see warfare thanks to Ukraine’s incredibly effective use of low-cost capabilities for major impact, but it has also posed a major political question in relation to UK defence procurement: Would the foreign Governments where those international businesses are based allow the UK to utilise, deploy or gift those capabilities to Ukraine. Whatever the answer, what became clear is that we sometimes lacked the sovereign ability to act without consultation or approval. In 2025 we saw the publication of the Strategic Defence Review and the Defence Industrial Strategy (as I write this, we are awaiting the publication of final of the suite of documents, the Defence Investment Plan). At the heart of all three are a number of assumptions and objectives which move the UK away from the model that drove that massive upturn in competed MOD contracts. The idea that the UK should ensure greater sovereign control over the defence supply chain has grown in recent years. There is no doubt that having a sovereign supply chain for a key capability means that the UK would have 'freedom of action’ in times of conflict, removing the concern that an ally or supposed ally might either prevent us from selling or deploying a capability which includes their hardware or software. Not only does that ‘freedom of action’ issue impact on operational deployment of some capabilities but also avoids us being lower on the priority list for a non-UK supplier when their own national Government dictate their priorities in times of emergencies. A recent non-defence example of this issue was the challenges seen around access to vaccines and PPE during the COVID pandemic, which shows where that can lead in extremis. However, sovereign supply is not just about ‘freedom of action.' There can be a sizeable impact on economic prosperity. If equipment is purchased, designed and manufactured in the UK, we create or sustain high-value jobs not only in the contracted supplier but also in the Tier 2, 3 and 4 parts of that supply chain which means also supporting the Small and Medium Enterprises that Government seeks to support.  We know from the Economic Impact Assessment reports across the sector, that defence jobs deliver really strong income multipliers, delivering value across communities and generating significant additional economic benefits as suppliers purchase materials and employees use salary payments to cover the cost of living and funding leisure activities. It may appear that I’m arguing here for all defence contracts to go to UK companies, but that doesn’t need to be the case (assuming that we are comfortable with the ‘freedom of action’ point). The issue for me is about where the activity is undertaken and where the Intellectual Property Rights reside. If we can ensure that international companies commit to undertaking critical design, manufacture and integration activities in the UK as part of their contracts then we not only improve the resilience of our defence supply chain at a time when the world feels increasingly uncertain but we also create increased prosperity and, in turn, the taxation which allows the defence budget and the economy as a whole to grow as intended. The Offset policy referenced in the Defence Industrial Strategy should hopefully help ensure that we achieve those goals. However, success will be dependent upon the control mechanisms and remedies that the UK Government puts in place - to ensure compliance - with countries such as Canada and Australia having already demonstrated how that might be achieved. Finally, then, once you take account of those issues in our defence procurement polici...