Modern military advantage is increasingly defined by speed, adaptability, and the ability to scale production rapidly. Yet as warfare accelerates into the drone age—seen most starkly in Ukraine—the UK was mired in delays to the long-awaited Defence Investment Plan (DIP), intended to underpin delivery of the Strategic Defence Review (SDR) 2025. In light of the plan being published ahead of the NATO summit today, some critics argue that the delay has caused significant harm, reflecting a broader issue in defence: whether the UK’s procurement and industrial systems are sufficiently enabled to deliver the capabilities required for modern warfare. The Ministry of Defence (MoD) itself has acknowledged the pressure, with National Armaments Director Rupert Pearce noting that “there are some things we are waiting for the DIP to do, and that delay is costing people… Time is money in procurement.” This tension between strategic ambition, funding and implementation is feeding wider unease about national preparedness and the extent to which defence is treated as an urgent political priority. Those concerns are echoed by Andriy Dovbenko, a London-based Ukrainian entrepreneur and founder of the UK-Ukraine TechExchange, a platform connecting Ukrainian defence and technology companies with UK investors and industry partners. Speaking to Mace Magazine, Dovbenko said: “As someone who works closely with both the UK and Ukraine, I worry that too many people still see defence spending as an abstract political debate rather than a question of national preparedness.”

"Countries across Europe are moving with greater urgency because they recognise the world has changed"

Dovbenko argues that the UK risks falling behind its NATO allies. “Countries across Europe are moving with greater urgency because they recognise the world has changed,” he said, pointing to Germany’s shift in defence investment, Poland’s military modernisation, and growing US engagement with Ukraine’s defence technology ecosystem. While the UK remains a strong supporter of Ukraine, Dovbenko warns that “goodwill alone is not a defence strategy,” adding that there is a need for “greater urgency, a clearer long-term plan and a more honest public conversation about why defence spending matters.” He concludes that “preparedness is always expensive, but history shows that being unprepared costs far more.”

"History shows that being unprepared costs far more."

If preparedness now depends on speed and adaptability, nowhere is that reality clearer than in Ukraine, where drone warfare has transformed both combat and procurement. Rapid deployment of low-cost systems—particularly first-person view (FPV) drones—has become central to operational effectiveness. By late 2025, reports suggested Ukrainian drones were responsible for killing more Russian soldiers than were being recruited in the same period. Robert Brovdi, commander of Ukraine’s unmanned systems forces, claimed that his units accounted for around one-third of Russian battlefield casualties, with each kill or incapacitation costing roughly $878. The cost-exchange ratio is indeed stark: FPV drones typically cost between $400 and $500, compared with around $3,000 for a single 155mm NATO artillery shell. In many cases, six to eight FPVs can be produced for the price of one shell, reinforcing the economic logic behind Ukraine’s shift towards mass drone production and use on the battlefield. As Brovdi told The Economist, “We need to keep milking this cow, the Russian army, for everything it’s worth, exhausting it beyond its maximum capacity.”

"Ukraine has restructured procurement at speed"

This radical change in warfare is not only tactical but industrial. In January 2026, Ukraine’s National Security and Defence Council claimed domestic production capacity of up to eight million FPV drones annually, supported by more than 160 firms operating inside the country. Ukraine has restructured procurement at speed, allowing frontline units to source systems directly from manufacturers and feed real-time operational feedback into production cycles. Initiatives such as the “Army of Drones” programme and the Brave1 tech incubator have further accelerated this model by enabling rapid certification, funding, and deployment of privately produced systems. By 2025, more than 500 Ukrainian manufacturers were contributing to drone production, supported by simplified contracting procedures and tax incentives designed to scale output quickly. The effectiveness of this approach is reflected in battlefield outcomes. A single $500 FPV drone reportedly disabled a Russian Buk air-defence system valued at around $40 million—an extreme illustration of the asymmetric cost dynamics now defining modern conflict. As Brooks Newmark, founder of UK defence drone company Trypillian, observed: “What we are seeing in Ukraine is a very different model, where rapid iteration and continuous updates are essential. In some cases, even short delays between requ...